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Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi 
Medallions, and the Propriety of “Property” 
Tom W. Bell* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Paper relates two stories with a common moral. The 
first, discussed in Section I, describes how copyright porn trolls 
have in effect, and to the chagrin of courts and commentators, 
engaged in a massive extortion scheme. The second, discussed in 
Section II, describes how beneficiaries of taxi medallions have 
resorted to rioting and violence to fend off competition from new 
transportation services like Uber and Lyft. 
Section III sums up the moral to both stories: tragedy follows 
when the law tries to protect fuzzy and ill-defended privileges 
with rules better suited for protecting common law property. 
With both copyright and taxi medallions, lawmakers have 
created entitlements that have only some of property’s virtues, 
and no good claim to its name, but powers as great or greater 
than those that the common law affords to property owners. We 
would have less reason to worry about mass extortion by 
copyright trolls and violence by the dependents of taxi medallions 
if we limited their privileges to liability remedies. 
This Paper concludes that “privilege” offers a more accurate 
description of copyrights and taxi medallions than “property” 
does. They possess only some of the attributes of property, such 
as exclusivity or alienability. Property consists of more than just 
a few admirable functional features, however. It has roots in 
nature, custom, and the common law. And the remedies that it 
puts at the disposal of property owners prove too powerful when 
invoked in the service of poorly defined and ill-defended 
privileges.  
We might well wonder whether lawmakers should create 
copyrights and taxi medallions at all. Both rely on artificially 
 
 * Professor, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. This Paper won a 
Federalist Society 2014 “Intellectual Property and Free Enterprise” prize. For comments, 
I thank Donald Kochan and participants at the Federalist Society’s “Intellectual Property 
and Free Enterprise” symposium; for research assistance, I thank Sherry Leysen and 
Matthew Flyntz of the Chapman Law Library. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:08 PM 
800 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
imposing scarcity—barring free enjoyment of public goods in the 
first place and free access to public customers in the other—a 
practice that has the immediate effect of making their select 
beneficiaries much better off and everybody else a little worse off. 
Even if we can in theory excuse those temporary costs as a just 
price for greater long term gains, such as stimulating the 
creation of original expressive works and preventing failure in 
the market for personal transportation services, in practice 
things do not always work out so nicely. The combination of 
concentrated benefits, diffuse costs, and unchecked political 
power invites a public choice disaster, wherein a privileged few 
successfully lobby for greater power and wealth, leaving the rest 
of us with less of both.1 
Those represent valid concerns about copyrights and taxi 
medallions, but they are not ones pressed by this Paper. Here, it 
suffices to observe that woe follows when the law endows 
statutory privileges with powers equal to or greater than those 
that protect property, and to counsel less coercive remedies as a 
cure. That would not only generate welcome policy effects but 
also help safeguard the propriety of “property.” 
I. COPYRIGHT PORN TROLLS 
Copyright plaintiffs’ attorneys across the United States have, 
of late, made a business out of accusing thousands of John Does 
at a time with having infringed their clients’ pornographic films 
via public file sharing services.2 These suits apparently aim at 
little more than winning subpoenas to uncover the identities of 
the defendants, whom the plaintiffs then threaten with the 
Copyright Act’s extraordinary remedies and public disclosure of 
the suspected porn use. These hardball tactics have netted 
millions in settlement payments from guilty and innocent alike—
and attracted sharp criticism. Judges and commentators alike 
have described the phenomenon as little better than mass 
extortion. This Section reveals the dirty tricks played by Internet 
porn trolls and blames their success on the notion that copyright 
deserves not just the same protections afforded to common law 
property but even greater ones. 
 
 1 For evidence of that effect, see Emily Badger, The Taxi Industry Is Crushing Uber 
and Lyft on the Lobbying Front, 3,500 to 1, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/31/the-taxi-industry-is-crushi 
ng-uber-and-lyft-on-the-lobbying-front-3500-to-1/. 
 2 See generally Christopher Civil, Mass Copyright Infringement Litigation: Of 
Trolls, Pornography, Settlement and Joinder, 30 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2 (2014); 
Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of Extortive Pornographic 
“Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventive Approaches, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 165 
(2013). 
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The last decade has seen an astonishing increase in 
copyright lawsuits, filed against thousands of John Doe 
defendants at a time, accusing all of taking part in the illegal 
sharing of pornographic files. These lawsuits, which bear all the 
marks of trolling expeditions, have become the most common 
form of copyright litigation in several U.S. districts.3 In some, 
they represent more than half of all new cases filed.4 
How do these cases arise? Typically, a small firm that 
represents producers holding copyrights in pornographic films 
examines traffic on BitTorrent, an open source file-sharing 
network, to see if it can identify unauthorized copying and 
distribution of the copyrighted works. If successful, this 
monitoring generates lists of thousands of suspect Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses.5 The firm then seeks to convince a court 
to permit joinder of all the defendants in a single suit—an effort 
that, if not always successful, succeeds often enough to make 
these massive lawsuits profitable. If it can surmount that hurdle, 
the plaintiff law firm then uses court-ordered discovery to force 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to reveal the persons behind 
the IP addresses.6 
Once it has the names and contact information for thousands 
of defendants in hand, the copyright porn troll can begin reaping 
settlement payments of a few thousand dollars from each. The 
troll reminds reluctant defendants that litigation will reveal 
their alleged porn viewing habits to the public and, more 
relevantly for present purposes, expose them to the prospect of 
up to $150,000 in statutory damages for each infringed work.7 
The result: easy money from cowed defendants, innocent and 
guilty alike. 
Perhaps due to the vast amount of fast money to be made, 
copyright porn trolls have hardly covered themselves in honor. 
Their practices have won judicial rebuke and sanctions. Judge 
Otis D. Wright of the U.S. Central District of California described 
one such lawsuit pending before him as “essentially an extortion 
scheme.”8 Another firm participating in the practice has faced 
 
 3 Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105,  
1107 (2015). 
 4 Id. at 1108. 
 5 Note that IP here stands for “Internet Protocol” and not “Intellectual Property.” 
 6 See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(compelling disclosure of Does’ identities by third-party ISPs). 
 7 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
 8 Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–10, No. 2:12-CV-3623-ODW, 2012 WL 5382304, 
at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012). 
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claims of identity theft and manufacturing litigation.9 A class 
action lawsuit was recently filed charging the plaintiff 
pornographers with racketeering, fraud, defamation, and other 
charges, all arising out of their association with litigation trolling 
strategies.10 Perhaps most of the blame for these infelicities 
should fall on the characters involved and the lure of easy money. 
Nonetheless, it seems as if a certain moral stink pervades the 
whole business of copyright porn litigation. 
The common law would never support anything akin to this 
sort of mass extortion. That copyright has encouraged porn trolls 
to adopt such tactics suggests that its privileges not only match 
the legal potency of property rights but exceed it. And, indeed, 
porn trolls’ suits rely crucially on special provisions of the 
Copyright Act to win access to legal remedies unknown in the 
common law. A fellow could write an entire book about the 
virtues of conceiving copyright as a form of statutory privilege 
rather than as a form of property.11 Suffice it here to say that the 
lawsuits brought by copyright porn trolls show all too clearly the 
woes that follow when statutory privileges acquire powers not 
just equal to those of property, but greater than them. 
But the problem is not simply that copyright has arrogated 
unto itself coercive powers even greater than those afforded to 
owners of private property. If copyrights functioned with the 
same efficiency as tangible property—if copyright transactions 
had low costs, in other words—it might not be such a bad idea to 
extend to copyrights the protections given to property. In 
actuality, transactions in copyrights impose notoriously high 
costs. The problems start with the occasional but typically thorny 
difficulties of establishing who has good title to a given work. 
They continue into questions about the fuzzy border between 
copying and fair use. 
Most notably for present purposes, transactions in Internet 
porn copyrights evidently impose considerable enforcement costs. 
It proves difficult for copyright holders to protect their works via 
self-help measures, to detect when infringement happens, and to 
obtain service over the responsible parties. Whether we rue that 
situation or not, the economic fact remains: transactions in 
 
 9 See Andrea Peterson & Timothy B. Lee, Firm Accused of Uploading Porn, Shaking 
Down People Who Download It, WASH. POST SWITCH BLOG (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/16/firm-accused-of-uploadin 
g-porn-shaking-down-people-who-download-it/. 
 10 See David Kravets, Porn Studios Accused of Screwing Their Fans in BitTorrent 
Lawsuits, WIRED (July 9, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/07/porn-studios-screw-fans/. 
 11 See TOM W. BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW, AND THE 
COMMON GOOD (2014). 
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Internet porn copyrights do not possess the same relatively low 
costs that characterize traditional forms of property. As Section 
III discusses below, that fact has ramifications for the efficiency 
of protecting copyrights with property remedies (or, as we might 
say in copyright’s case, property-plus remedies). First, though, 
the next Section will find similar attributes in taxi medallions. 
II. WASTING TAXI MEDALLIONS 
The privilege that cities grant to taxis—the exclusive right to 
serve passengers flagging down rides—has come under pressure 
from Uber, Lyft, and other networked transportation services. 
This fresh competition has driven down the value of taxi 
medallions, causing their holders to complain of theft by private 
parties and takings by public ones. Such claims look unlikely to 
move courts, however, which typically treat taxi medallions not 
as types of property but as government-granted privileges 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.12 
Frustrated by the dissipation of their rents, taxi drivers and 
medallion holders have resorted to blocking traffic and physically 
assaulting their new competitors. That speaks less to the 
injustice of denying them legal relief, however, than it does to the 
inefficiencies of granting taxi services transferable and exclusive 
rights to serve a particular segment of the transportation 
market. Treating taxi medallions like property has fostered an 
undue sense of entitlement, exacerbating conflict and 
discouraging innovation. This Section discusses the problem and 
what to do about it. 
Of what use is a taxi medallion? Generally speaking, it 
affords a legal entitlement, exclusive but enjoyed collectively by 
all licensed taxis within a given municipality, to transport on 
public streets passengers who have been solicited on those 
streets.13 Outside of that privilege fall for-hire vehicles, which 
cannot legally solicit paying passengers on public streets but 
must instead pick up only those who have arranged ahead of 
time for a ride.14 The distinction between customers who flag 
down rides on city streets and customers who otherwise arrange 
for transport has long protected limos and other private car 
 
 12 Note that this Paper uses “privilege” solely as a legal term of art and not to 
describe the social effects of phenomena like racism or sexism. 
 13 See People v. Ethridge, 215 N.Y.S.2d 664, 667–68 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1961) 
(holding that a vehicle not responding to street hails, but rather operating solely in 
response to previous arrangement, need not be licensed as a taxi). Cf. People v. Betzig, 79 
N.E.2d 747 (N.Y. 1948) (finding evidence of cars on private property with “taxi” signs in 
their windows sufficient to support a conviction for operating a taxicab for hire). 
 14 Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York 
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 134 (2013). 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:08 PM 
804 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
services from taxi licensing requirements.15 Uber, Lyft, and 
similar networked services argue that they enjoy the same 
loophole. On that point, however, opinions differ—and blood has 
flowed.16 
Functionally speaking, Uber, Lyft, SideCar, Hailo, and 
similar services work like taxis hailed not by hand but by 
smartphone app. They allow passengers with Internet access to 
connect with independent contractors willing and able to provide 
private car services. These companies do not themselves own or 
operate vehicles; they instead run markets for personal 
transportation and make money from charging commissions on 
sales.17 
Lyft’s general counsel, Kristin Svercheck, has described the 
company as little more than an Internet site. “What we’re really 
doing is acting as an intermediary, allowing two individuals to 
connect,” she explained.18 She insists on that characterization to 
support her claim that Lyft enjoys the shelter of section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, a 1996 law passed to protect 
websites from bogus defamation claims, but written in terms so 
broad that it protects many other kinds of intermediary 
services.19 Her theory has yet to receive judicial scrutiny; there 
has of yet been no court opinion directly relating to ride-sharing 
apps. 
Regardless of whether that particular defense ends up 
benefitting Lyft and other networked transportation companies, 
they enjoy other advantages over taxis and similarly regulated 
services. One of the biggest: simply avoiding the hassles and 
expenses of the regulations themselves. The typical taxi sports 
dozens of mandatory signs and stickers, purchased from the 
licensing authority—to say nothing of the medallion itself—
attached to the vehicle via holes punched through its sheet 
metal.20 
Unless and until local authorities force them to comply with 
the same regulations applicable to taxis, moreover, networked 
 
 15 See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 103 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Ct. Spec. Sess. App. Part 1951), 
aff’d, 103 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1952). 
 16 See, e.g., Carol Matlack, Paris Cabbies Slash Tires, Smash Windshields in Protest 
Against Uber, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.business 
week.com/articles/2014-01-13/paris-cabbies-slash-tires-smash-windshields-in-protest-agai 
nst-uber (reporting on injuries resulting from attack of Paris cabbies on Uber vehicles). 
 17 Stephanie Francis Ward, ‘App’ Me a Ride: Internet Car Companies Offer 
Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13, 13. 
 18 Id. at 17. 
 19 Id. at 14; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 20 Emily Badger, Is This Worth $350,000? No One Knows, WASH. POST, June 22, 
2014, at G1. 
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transportation companies do not have to buy insurance for their 
drivers (who instead provide their own), run background checks 
on them (though they often do so voluntarily), use only drivers 
that have commercial licenses, or submit their vehicles to special 
inspection.21 Beneficiaries of the taxi privilege have fought back, 
lobbying to have the same regulations which burden them 
imposed on their new competitors.22 “We are not afraid of 
competition, but we want fair competition,” explained Joel Wood, 
a Teamsters organizer advocating on behalf of taxi drivers in the 
D.C. area.23  
In some markets, competition from networked 
transportation services has evidently driven down the value of 
taxi medallions.24 Even in municipalities that have not seen 
medallion values slip, people who work in the taxi industry feel 
threatened by the loss of paying customers. Drivers feel “a lot of 
vulnerability and anger” about the issue, explained Bhairavi 
Desai, executive director of the National Taxi Workers Alliance, a 
group recently created to respond to the new competitive 
threat.25 “We have always had illegal pickups and it’s always 
been an economic issue for drivers, especially in times of 
recession, but now multibillion-dollar companies are 
orchestrating these illegal pickups.”26 
Those threatened by changes to the taxi status quo feel so 
much anxiety and frustration that they have resorted to civil 
disobedience. Taxi drivers in London, Paris, and other cities 
protested the advent of new competition by parking in public 
streets, blocking traffic.27 Their strong feelings have 
unfortunately boiled over into violence, resulting in slashed tires, 
smashed windows, and physical injuries.28 
Why have those who work in the taxi industry responded so 
strongly to the advent of networked transportation services? 
Perhaps because the rhetoric of property, misapplied to taxi 
medallions, has given them an inflated sense of entitlement. 
Opponents of networked transportation services thus accuse 
 
 21 Luz Lazo, Taxicab Interests Unite to Fight, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2014, at B1. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Badger, supra note 20. 
 25 Lazo, supra note 21.  
 26 Id. 
 27 Mark Scott, Traffic Snarls in Europe as Taxi Drivers Protest Against Uber, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (June 11, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/taxi-protests-
against-uber-in-europe-to-snarl-traffic; Taxi Drivers Across Europe Protest Against Uber 
App – In Pictures, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ 
gallery/2014/jun/11/taxi-drivers-across-europe-protest-uber-app-in-pictures. 
 28 Matlack, supra note 16. 
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them of “stealing work” from licensed drivers—as if paying 
customers could be owned.29 
We see the same mindset at work in legal arguments, made 
by the holders of taxi medallions, that if a city were to reform its 
transportation policies to allow more competition to the 
detriment of established services, it would thereby take the 
private property embodied in the medallions and owe just 
compensation for doing so.30 Research into the market price of 
taxi medallions, which indicates that their present values do not 
reflect expectations of continued rents, makes that claim look 
economically dubious.31 Research into the applicable legal 
precedents makes it look utterly hopeless.32 Just as it seems to 
encourage violence in the street, however, calling taxi medallions 
“property” seems to encourage outlandish arguments. 
Bombastic rhetoric aside, taxi medallions do not constitute 
property except in a strained sense of the word. Unlike any 
traditional kind of property, taxi medallions do not exist in a 
state of nature, by custom, or at the common law; they arise 
solely by legislative fiat.33 Though the right of exclusive use has 
been described as the foremost attribute of property,34 the rights 
secured by a taxi medallion belong not to any particular 
individual but only collectively—by all those licensed to serve 
 
 29 Lazo, supra note 21 (quoting Joel Wood, a Teamsters organizer advocating on 
behalf of taxi drivers). 
 30 Badger, supra note 20 (discussing arguments of Michael Shakman and Edward 
Feldman, Chicago attorneys suing the city on behalf of investors and companies that rely 
on taxi medallions). 
 31 See Peter Van Doren, Should Taxi Medallion Owners Be Compensated?, CATO 
INST. CATO AT LIBERTY (June 23, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/should-taxi-
medallion-owners-be-compensated. 
 32 Steve Oxenhandler, Comment, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of a Fifth Amendment, 
Compensable Property Interest, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 113 (2000) (surveying the law to conclude 
that taxi medallion reform can give rise to valid takings claims only if the government 
expressly creates a compensable property interest or requires the holder to divest all 
interests in the license without surrendering it to the government, and that only 
abolishing the excludability or alienability of the medallion rises to the level of a taking). 
 33 To statist legal positivists, who care more about practical effects than origins or 
moral legitimacies, those deficiencies hardly disqualify taxi medallions as property; 
indeed, the seminal article in that line of thinking expressly includes taxi medallions as a 
form of legal entitlement meriting the label “property.” See Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (1964). As the discussion immediately below indicates, 
however, courts have not followed scholars in that characterization. 
 34 See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to 
exclude others.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 731 (1998) (explaining the right to exclude as “a necessary and sufficient condition of 
identifying the existence of property”). But see Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting 
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003) (criticizing the view that exclusion is 
the sine qua non of property and arguing for also defining property in terms of 
acquisition, use, and disposal). 
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passengers flagging down paid transport on public streets.35 
Whereas property traditionally enjoys free alienability, taxi 
medallions cannot be transferred without the supervision and 
approval of licensing authorities.36 
From observations such as these, some authority has it that 
taxi medallions simply do not qualify as property. As 
O’Connor v. Superior Court put it, “A license or permit to engage 
in the taxicab business, issued by the city pursuant to its police 
power, does not convey a vested property right.”37 Other 
authority, following the lead of the Supreme Court in 
Goldberg v. Kelly, which held that welfare recipients facing 
termination of their benefits enjoyed certain due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment,38 has afforded taxi medallions 
property-like protections in certain situations. Flower Cab 
Co. v. Petitte held that where a municipal ordinance gave each 
taxi license holder exclusive possession of the license, the right to 
assign it with few qualifications, and automatic renewal absent 
revocation or suspension, the license qualified for protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the 
municipality could not unilaterally impose a moratorium on taxi 
license transfers.39 That probably speaks less to whether taxi 
medallions qualify as property as a theoretical matter, though, 
than it does to whether government agencies simply have to 
follow through on their promises. 
At all events, authorities agree that municipalities have very 
broad discretion to grant or refuse taxi licenses.40 As the court in 
Yellow Cab Co. v. Ingalls put it, “A license, permit, or certificate 
of public convenience and necessity to operate motor vehicles on 
the public streets of a municipality for the conduct of a strictly 
private business is not an inherent right but is a mere 
privilege.”41 Furthermore, “the vast majority of states do not 
 
 35 At present, for instance, New York City licenses 13,237 taxis. Wyman, supra note 
14, at 131. 
 36 Travel House of Buffalo, Inc. v. Grzechowiak, 296 N.Y.S.2d 689, 697 (App. Div. 
1968) (holding that unauthorized transferees of taxi medallions were not entitled to 
renewal of licenses), aff’d, 250 N.E.2d 355 (N.Y. 1969); Vill. Taxi Corp. v. Beltre, 933 
N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 2011) (rendering illegal and unenforceable an agreement allowing 
for the conveyance of a taxicab license without involvement of municipal authorities). 
 37 O’Connor v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (Ct. App. 1979). 
 38 397 U.S. 254, 261–63 (1970); see also Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) 
(stating in dictum that hearings determining an individual’s continued eligibility for food 
stamps must satisfy due process); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 
(1972) (conjecturing that an employee of a public university could have a “property” 
interest in his employment sufficient to give him due process rights). 
 39 658 F. Supp. 1170, 1175, 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 40 9A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26:177 (3d ed. 
rev. 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
 41 104 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
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consider a taxicab license a Fifth Amendment, compensable 
property interest.”42 More specifically, taxi medallion holders 
have no property claim to the gains they enjoy thanks to 
regulatory barriers on competition, leaving cities free to raise 
caps on the number of licensed taxis—even if doing so causes the 
market value of taxi medallions to crash.43 
More than a form of property, taxi medallions resemble 
government-granted privileges. This does not strip them of all 
legal standing, of course. When Goldberg v. Kelly held that 
beneficiaries of public welfare may enjoy Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights, such as the right to a pre-termination 
hearing, the Court did not do so because it equated welfare 
benefits to property.44 Charles A. Reich, whose scholarship the 
Court cited, did not even call them a kind of “new property” 
(a name that Reich popularized for various government 
entitlements). Rather, the Court went only so far as to observe, 
“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more 
like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”45 
The Court’s observation, while true, invites the conclusion 
that “property” and “gratuity” exhaust the options. Not so. 
Restricting us to those two choices alone would constitute the 
fallacy of the excluded middle. In fact, the Court’s analysis leaves 
room for a third category of legal entitlement: privilege. This 
middle option describes welfare benefits better than either 
“property” or “gratuity” does. This, the Goldberg Court itself 
recognized when it retorted, “The constitutional challenge cannot 
be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are 
‘a “privilege” and not a “right.”’”46 As the Court implied, to call 
them privileges only begins the analysis. 
Goldberg completed the analysis by holding that welfare 
benefits may enjoy some of the same protections—those relating 
to due process—that the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on 
property, proper. Though the Court in Goldberg could have made 
more clear what kind of entitlement it had in mind, it still 
deserves credit for developing the jurisprudence of privileges. 
How appropriate, too, that it did so while interpreting the scope 
 
 42 Oxenhandler, supra note 32, at 132. 
 43 See Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 509 
(8th Cir. 2009). 
 44 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
 45 Id. at 262 n.8. 
 46 Id. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, which itself speaks of 
“privileges.”47  
More relevantly for present purposes, taxi medallions fall 
short of property not merely as a matter of legal doctrine but of 
actual practice. The problem arises from the imperfect 
enforcement of medallion holders’ supposedly exclusive (albeit 
collectively shared) right to pick up passengers hailing rides on 
city streets. It has long been the case that, whether for want of 
ability or will, municipal authorities fail to stop a great many 
unlicensed taxi rides. For instance, so-called “gypsy cabs” began 
appearing on the streets of New York City in the early 1960s, 
when the supply of taxi medallions began to fall behind market 
demand.48 Today, in upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs of 
New York City, for-hire vehicles illegally pick up an estimated 
100,000 street-hail passengers per day.49 
Even absent Lyft and other networked ride sharing services, 
the holders of taxi medallions would suffer a great deal of 
trespass on their privileges. The advent of new competitors 
merely worsens the difficulties of policing the borders of the taxi 
privilege. As the next section discusses, that makes taxi 
medallions poor candidates for the power of property’s remedies. 
III. THE PROPRIETY OF “PROPERTY” 
What do extortionate porn trolls and rioting taxi drivers 
share in common? At root, they both arise from the same basic 
problem: legal entitlements with very high enforcement costs. 
Those enforcement costs constitute a species of transaction costs. 
Like other transaction costs, they make it difficult for contesting 
parties to negotiate voluntary transfers of the entitlements in 
question—to license porn downloads or lease taxi medallions, for 
instance. Standard economic theory suggests that we should 
therefore enforce these entitlements not with a property rule but 
with, at most, a liability one. This Section explains. 
Both those who hold copyrights in pornographic films and 
those who hold taxi medallions find it very expensive to enforce 
their legal entitlements. They typically find it difficult to discover 
when transgressions of their entitlements occur in the first 
 
 47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). Note, however, that 
whereas “privilege” appears in the first clause, the Goldberg Court’s analysis focused on 
the second. 
 48 See Wyman, supra note 14, at 171. 
 49 Id. at 134. 
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instance. And even when decreasing revenues make it evident 
that many such transgressions must have occurred, they find it 
difficult to identify the responsible parties. Even once having 
caught and identified a responsible party, the privilege holders 
find it expensive to enforce their entitlements. 
In the particular case of Internet porn, those who hold 
copyrights find it very costly, if not impossible, to identify exactly 
who has infringed their works. They must therefore resort to 
legally and ethically dubious mass joinder lawsuits against 
unidentified John Does, described above, or learn to live with 
Internet infringers. Stopping even known infringers is not, 
moreover, technically easy. Given the small prospect they have of 
catching repeat offenders, copyright porn trolls have to resort to 
dire threats of statutory damages and the prospect of public 
embarrassment if they want to get any traction in the effort to 
end infringement. There is no self-help remedy akin to the fences 
and locks that owners of tangible property employ as their first 
and typically sufficient line of defense. 
The shame suffered by those accused by copyright porn trolls 
represents yet another kind of transaction cost. To the extent 
that consumers do not want to be associated with buying or 
licensing the use of a pornographic work, legal exchanges grow 
more and more costly. At some limit, for some consumers, shame 
can render transaction costs infinite. It all adds up to yet another 
reason to question the propriety of claiming that copyright porn 
trolls act in defense of property rights. 
Those who hold, or directly benefit from, taxi medallions face 
not only high enforcement costs but also the discouraging effects 
that result from their collective enjoyment of the exclusive right 
to convey taxi passengers. The long history of unlicensed taxis 
demonstrates that they are not easy to catch in any event. The 
advent of networked transport services makes it even more 
difficult to identify when a passenger has hailed a ride and, if so, 
whether a taxi should have done the job. And as with copyright, 
there are no effective self-help remedies. The spasms of violence 
exhibited by frustrated taxi drivers against their new 
competitors reflect not a reasoned long-term strategy for 
defending their privileges but a mere atavistic release.  
On top of those problems, individual medallion holders or 
drivers have only diluted incentives to enforce their 
industry-wide privilege, since the benefits of the effort largely 
accrue to other parties. Despite rioting and attacks on 
competitors’ vehicles, the taxi industry thus largely relies on 
public officials to police the boundaries of the taxi medallion’s 
exclusive market. But this mechanism suffers its own incentive 
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problem—one that results from the agent-principal relationship 
existing between law enforcement officers and the taxi medallion 
holders they defend.50 And, of course, law enforcement officers 
find it difficult to catch unlicensed taxi services even when they 
feel sufficiently motivated to try. 
Yet another kind of transaction cost, one deeply rooted in 
human psychology and particularly associated with property 
claims, also deserves mention: the endowment effect.51 Because it 
causes those who think they own something to systematically 
overvalue it, the endowment effect threatens to raise transaction 
costs in goods—such as copyrights or taxi medallions—that the 
law imbues with property-like attributes. Far from a mere 
theoretical concern, this effect has been observed in the 
laboratory under controlled conditions.52 We should thus expect 
that the more someone holding a copyright or taxi medallion 
regards it as a vested property right rather than as a contingent 
privilege, the endowment effect will skew their assessment of its 
value and raise the costs of transacting with them. 
Scholars of law and economics have long observed that when 
high transaction costs inhibit voluntary transactions, property 
rules offer a less efficient mechanism for allocating rights to an 
entitlement than liability rules do.53 The law thus ordinarily 
empowers property owners to enforce their rights through 
injunctive relief while limiting the victims of negligence—who 
cannot very well know beforehand with whom they should 
bargain—to damages. The high transaction costs associated with 
the enforcement of Internet porn copyrights and taxi medallions 
suggests the wisdom of adopting a similar policy. We should in 
other words stop treating those copyrights as worthy of the same 
protections afforded to property rights and instead remedy them 
only by payment of damages.54 
In the case of copyright, the problem goes beyond a privilege 
endowed with legal remedies equal to those protecting property. 
 
 50 See generally Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 
8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 205–06 (2005) (defining the “canonical” principal-agent model 
economists have developed). 
 51 See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–97 (1991), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/ 
pdfplus/10.1257/jep.5.1.193. 
 52 See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing 
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 53 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 54 Other scholars have already suggested this approach to intellectual property, 
albeit for reasons grounded not in economic efficiency but in the First Amendment. See 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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After all, it would not prove so troubling if copyright porn trolls 
sought only injunctions against infringement. Rather, the 
problem comes from copyright holders invoking powers even 
greater than those that the common law affords property owners. 
As detailed above, copyright porn trolls need not show that the 
defendants they accuse of infringement have inflicted any 
damages or reaped any unjust profits. Rather, the availability of 
statutory damages allows copyright porn trolls to go straight to 
threatening with liability of up to $150,000 for each work 
allegedly infringed.55 A sum that large—or even one considerably 
smaller—would represent hundreds of times more than the 
actual losses suffered by the copyright holder.  
Some scholars have argued that so extreme a result violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s edict against excessive fines.56 Courts 
have not smiled on such arguments, however, reasoning that the 
fines referenced in the Eighth Amendment must go to 
government coffers, whereas statutory damages go to private 
ones.57 Regardless, it remains indisputable that statutory 
damages far exceed even the most generous monetary relief that 
the common law affords to property owners. Here, copyright not 
only pretends to the status of property—it exceeds it.  
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVILEGES 
Copyright porn trolls and wasting taxi medallions alike 
demonstrate how public policy can suffer when statutory 
privileges pretend to the status of property rights: mass extortion 
and violence in streets. At root, these problems arise because 
both Internet porn copyrights and taxi medallions suffer from 
very high enforcement costs. This makes them poor candidates 
for the title of “property.” We would do better to recognize them 
as statutory privileges.  
What follows from recognizing copyrights and taxi 
medallions as statutory privileges? It means we should not 
safeguard them with remedies as powerful as those that protect 
traditional forms of property. Goldberg teaches that statutory 
privileges merit only due process protections under the 
 
 55 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
 56 See, e.g., Stephan Kinsella, Copyright Censorship Versus Free Speech and Human 
Rights; Excessive Fines and the Eighth Amendment, CENTER FOR STUDY INNOVATIVE 
FREEDOM (Sept. 6, 2011), http://c4sif.org/2011/09/copyright-censorship-versus-free-speech-
and-human-rights-excessive-fines-and-the-eighth-amendment/. 
 57 See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586 (6th 
Cir. 2007); see also Jeffrey Stavroff, Comment, Damages in Dissonance: The “Shocking” 
Penalty for Illegal Music File-Sharing, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 686–87 (2011) (reviewing 
case law). 
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Fourteenth Amendment—not the full panoply of rights that 
common law property enjoys in the Fourteenth Amendment and 
elsewhere in the Constitution. Sound economic theory suggests 
that indefensible and ill-defined privileges, such as copyrights in 
Internet porn and the taxi medallions facing networked 
competition, deserve neither injunctive remedies better suited for 
protecting property nor statutory damages far in excess of those 
that the common law would allow.  
More than just those particular answers to the question of 
what to do about copyright porn trolls and wasting taxi 
medallions, this Paper has sought to contribute to the 
jurisprudence of privilege. Courts and commentators too often 
categorize statutory entitlements like copyrights and taxi 
medallions as “property,” apparently convinced by features such 
as exclusivity and transferability, undaunted by the absence of 
any pedigree from natural rights or the common law, and unable 
to think of any more fitting label. It proves especially puzzling 
and distressing that self-avowed friends of property, such as 
some conservatives, classical liberals, and libertarians, would 
abuse the good name of property in such a fashion. They should 
instead safeguard “property” against the confusion that will 
follow if it comes to refer not to a traditional, natural, common 
law right but to a bestiary of modern, artificial, statutory 
privileges, such as welfare benefits, farm subsidies, copyrights, 
and taxi medallions. 
In calling for further development of the jurisprudence of 
privilege, this Paper proposes not something totally unknown, 
but something too often forgotten. As Adam Mossoff has ably 
documented, the law contained “omnipresent references to 
patents as privileges in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.”58 We could use more of that sort of talk today. 
Patents, copyrights, and other types of IP too often get classified 
as, well, intellectual property. We must speak clearly about these 
complicated and abstract matters if we want to think clearly 
about them. Good jurisprudence demands nothing less. On this 
point, we could learn something from our predecessors. 
In the long term, we should aim for courts and commentators 
to appreciate that sometimes “privilege” offers a better 
description of many legal entitlements than “property” does. The 
latter term has been overextended to subjects that possess only 
some of the attributes of property, such as exclusivity or 
 
 58 Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 969 
(2007). 
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alienability. Property consists of more than just a few functional 
features, however. It will always have roots in nature, custom, 
and the common law that statutory privileges, whatever their 
merits, of necessity lack. And in particular instances, as this 
Paper has documented with regard to copyright porn trolls and 
wasting taxi medallions, the remedies enjoyed by property 
owners will prove too powerful if put in the service of poorly 
defined and poorly defended privileges. 
